



THE appearance of Professor Haines' volume on The Revival of
Natural Law Concepts" and the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma in Thomas v. Reid,2 present anew the issue
whether state legislatures are limited in their powers by restric-
tions not found in the text of written constitutions. In the case
of Thomas v. Reid the court held invalid a legislative act requir-
ing a vote of sixty per cent of the qualified voters to authorize
the sale of a municipally-owned public utility, saying that ma-
jority rule is one of the foundation stones of our government 3
and that the legislature is powerless to take away the right of
local government existing in the several municipalities at the
time of the adoption of the state constitution.
Under our federal system of government it is obviously neces-
sary to look beyond the constitutional texts in order to discover
all restrictions upon state legislative power. In the field of con-
current powers, each new exercise of national power restricts
the field within which the states may act. Not only must federal
statutes be resorted to in order to discover the limits of state
legislative power, but in certain cases such statutes permit the
exercise of state legislative power in a manner otherwise for-
bidden by the federal constitution. Although Congress may not
delegate its powers to the states, 4 it may to some extent, by
affirmative action, remove impediments otherwise imposed upon
the state by the federal constitution.r
Aside from this there are no textual limitations upon state
legislatures other than those in written constitutions. The
* Garver Professor of Law, Yale University; author of STATE GOvEEN-
MENT (1928).
1Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (1930)
4 HARV. STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE.
2 285 Pac. 92 (1930). See (1930) 44 HAnv. L. Ruv. 133.
3 Similar expressions as to majority rule may be found in Maynard v.
Board, 84 Mich. 228, 47 N. W. 756 (1890), and in other cases involving tho
validity of proportional representation. See William Anderson, The Con-
stitutionality of Proportional Representation (Supp. 1923) NATIoNAL
MUNICIPAL REv.
4 Knickerbocker lee Company v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438
(1920).
5 In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865 (1891); Bicklc, Tho
Silence of Congress (1927) 41 HARv. L. REV. 200.
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Supreme Court of Ohio once took the view that the power of the
state legislature as to the state's internal affairs was limited by
the Ordinance of 1787, but this view has been explicitly rejected
by the United States Supreme Court., It is also well established
that, after a state is admitted to the union, no federal limitations
upon its power exist outside of the constitution of the United
States and the powers properly exercisable thereunder;
although, in admitting a territory to statehood, Congress may
require the state to impose limitations upon itself by its own
constitution, as was actually done in the cases of Arizona and
New Mexico." The Louisiana constitution of 1913 declared that
the prior constitution and all amendments thereto were super-
seded, but added that "the omission from this constitution of any
article of the constitution of 1898 and the amendments thereto
or of any other existing constitutional provision shall not amount
to the repeal thereof, unless the same be inconsistent with this
constitution." While this did not set up constitutional limita-
tions outside the terms of the written constitutions, it did give
the court a roving commission to determine what provisions in
prior constitutions were still in force.
Perhaps Bennett v. Jackso n 9 presents the most important
recent instance of an extra-constitutional limitation upon state
legislative power. The constitution of Indiana contains no provi-
sion regarding the calling of a constitutional convention. The
general view in this country, outside of Rhode Island, is that,
in the absence of such a provision, the legislature has power to
take steps for assembling a convention. The Indiana legislature
submitted the question of calling a convention to a popular
vote, which in 1914 resulted in an adverse decision. Neverthe-
less in 1917 the legislature passed an act calling a constitutional
convention. The Indiana Supreme Court said:
"We are of the opinion that the will of the people as expressed
in the election of 1914 is as binding on the general assembly as
a positive provision of the Constitution could be, and hence the
action of the legislature in calling a constitutional convention as
provided for in chapter 2, page 5, of the acts of 1917, is null and
void, being in conflict with section 1 of the Bill of Rights and
taking from the people the right to say when they desire a
change in their fundamental law." 10
0 See State v. Boone, 84 Ohio St. 346, 95 N. E. 924 (1911) and Donahey
v. Edmonson, 89 Ohio St. 93, 105 N. E. 269 (1913) ; Cincinnati v. Louisville
& Nashville R. R., 223 U. S. 390, 32 Sup. Ct. 2G7 (1912) and cases cited
in Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 120, 4V
7up. Ct. 409, 412 (1921).
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 31 Sup. Ct. 688 (1911).
-)ODD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1928) 22-24.
9186 Ind. bo3, lio Ix. E. 921 (1917).
10 Ibid. 540, 116 N. E. at 923.
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The court here appears to base its decision on a specific provision
of the state constitution, but the only parts of Section 1 of the
Indiana Bill of Rights upon which the decision may be based are
those which declare that "all power is inherent in the people"
and that "the people .have at all times the indefeasible right to
alter and reform their government."
Constitutional provisions must be construed, and under our
system of government, such construction is primarily a judicial
function. The very nature of a constitution makes it impossible,
even by the use of clear and explicit language, to meet all issues
of construction in advance. Some provisions are naturally more
explicit than others and require less judicial construction, or at
least attain greater certainty through construction." But the
language employed in constitutions necessarily raises implica-
tions, and the courts have developed or stated a mass of implied
powers in the federal system and of implied limitations in the
state system. 12 In constitutional construction two questions,
therefore, present themselves: (1) What constitutional text
applies to the specific issue under consideration? (2) What is the
meaning of the text? Technically, a limitation upon legislative
power discovered by the court to be within the language of a
written text cannot be considered as one found independently of
and in addition to the text, even though we may disagree with
the court as to whether the limitation is within the written
language.
The orthodox doctrine of American constitutional law that a
statute may be declared invalid only because of conflict with the
text of written constitutions, was well stated by Justice Iredell
in Calder v. Bull:
An even more recent effort to read an extra-constitutional limitation into
a constitutional text is that involved in the argument that the Eighteenth
Amendment could only have been ratified by conventions in the several
states, although the constitution of the United States expressly provides
for ratification by legislatures or conventions in the several states, "1as
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress".
The lengthy opinion by Judge Clark in support of this view is unconvinc-
ing (United States v. Sprague, 44 Fed. (2d), 967), as is also the more
lengthy brief of Appellees in the same case in the United States Supreme
Court, though the Appellees urged their view on the basis of the consti-
tutional text. The brief opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in United States
v. Sprague, 51 Sup. Ct. 220 (1931), adequately disposes of the matter.
11 See Dodd, The Problem of State Constitutional Construction (1920) 20
COL. L. REV. 635.
2 See Dodd, Implied Powers and Inplied Limitations (1919) 29 YAIa
L. J. 137. For a problem that has become increasingly important in recent
years see Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress (1923) 36 HARV. L.
REV. 548.
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"If any act of Congress, or of the legislature of a state, violates
those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void....
If, on the other hand, the legislature of the Union, or the legis-
lature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the
general scope of their constitutional power, the court cannot
pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment,
contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural
justice are regulated by no -fixed standard; the ablest and purest
of men have differed upon the subject; and all that the court
could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the legis-
lature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an
act which, in the opinion of the judges, .ias inconsistent with the
abstract principles of natural justice." 13
This statement has been frequently repeated or paraphrased by
later decisions in both national and state courts.14
As a corrolary to this principle it has often been said that in
order to present to a court an issue of constitutionality "some
particular clause of the constitution must be pointed out with
which the act is inconsistent." 1 The doctrine so stated is not
fully established, and has actually been denied in some cases.",
Courts occasionally have even sought out constitutional objec-
tions and passed upon them in cases where the parties had pre-
sented no constitutional issue.17 For present purposes, however,
it is sufficient to suggest that courts have not in any systematic
way required those contesting statutes to allege specific objec-
tions based upon constitutional texts; 21 and in invalidating
13 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 399 (U. S. 1798).
14 See Dorman v. State, 34 Ala. 216, 235 (1859); State v. Wheeler, 25
Conn. 290 (1856); Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, 516 (1878). See also
Denio, J., in Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 202, 212 (1854); Slack v. Jacob,
8 W. Va. 612, 634-639 (1875); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 393-
395 (Comstock), 411-412 (A. S. Johnson), 447-458 (Hubbard), 477 (T. A.
Johnson) (1856). Russ v. Commonwealth, 210 Pa. St. 544, 60 AtI. 169
(1905), presents a review of the Pennsylvania cases.
15 Gray v. McLendon, 134 Ga. 224, 67 S. E. 859 (1910). See State v.
Main, 16 Wis. 398, 415 (1863).
,- See Union Pacific R. R. v. Abilene, 78 Kan. 820, 822-24, 98 Pac. 224,
225 (1908).17 Kraus v. Lehman, 170 Ind. 408, 84 N. E. 769 (1908).
's In cases brought to the United States Supreme Court from the highest
state courts, the constitutional grounds are usually clear. Yet even here
difficulties sometimes present themselves. See Whitney v. California, 274
U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927) and People v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63,
49 Sup. Ct. 61 (1928). And sometimes a review on broad due process
grounds is sought on one basis and prosecuted on another. Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1928).
The same case may, of course, involve a number of constitutional issues,
based upon different parts of the same constitutional instrument. Some-
times a decision is based on inferences from the constitution as a whole.
In United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry., 160 U. S. 668, 683, 16 Sup. Ct.
427, 430 (1896), the court said that power in the national government "need
not be plainly and unmistakably deduced from any one of the particularly
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statutes the courts have not always referred to the specific con-
stitutional grounds upon which they have done so. This statement
applies particularly to state courts. While the real ground of con-
stitutional objection is usually clear, even though unstated, this
is not true of many cases, especially before 1850. This situation
adds to the difficulty of determining when decisions have been
based upon constitutional texts and when theories outside the
texts have been decisive. In many cases in which a court has
endorsed natural rights as a proper basis for invalidating stat-
utes, and has held a statute unconstitutional without the express
mention of a written constitutional provision, it may yet be clear
from a careful reading of the opinion, that such a text was in
mind as a basis for the decision.
But the influence of natural rights in causing statutes to be
declared unconstitutional should not be underestimated. Theories
of natural law played a large part in the movement leading up
to the American revolution, 9 and early judicial discussions fre-
quently quoted with approval the view of Sir Edward Coke in
Dr. Bonham's Case that "when an act of Parliament is against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such act
to be void." 20 In numerous statements from the revolutionary
period down to the present time, both state and federal courts
have spoken of the principles of natural right as if they were
judicially enforceable against legislative acts.21 One of the best
specified powers. Any number of those powers may be grouped together,
and an inference from them all may be drawn that the power claimed has
been conferred." For similar expressions in state decisions, see inf ra
note 80.
19 MCLAUGHLIN, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND PARTIES (1912)
75-85.
20 8 Rep. 118 a. See Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Reviw
(1926) 40 HARV. L. REV. 30; Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of
American Constitutional Law (19281929) 42 HAnv. L. REV. 149, 365;
Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law (1926) 20 AM. POL.
ScI. REV. 524. The argument of Quincy in Paxton's case is largely based
on this view, Quincy 474 (Mass. 1761). George Mason made use of it in
Robin v. Hardaway, Jeff. 109 (Va. 1772), as did James M. Varnuin in
argument in Trevitt v. Weeden (1786).
21 See the cases collected in the excellent article by Haines in The Law
of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Decisions (1916) 25 YALE L. J.
617, and in his recent volume, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS,
The cases in the United States Supreme Court have been carefully collected
by Reeder, Constitutional and Extra-Constitutional Restraints (1913) 61
U. of PA. L. REV. 441. See also Richard C. Dale in (1901) 24 A. 13. A.
REP. 294; Baldwin, The Courts as Conservators of Social Justice (1909) 9
COL. L. REV. 567; Keeler, Survival of the Theory of Natural Rights in Judi-
cial Decisions (1895) 5 YALE L. J. 14. Judge Oscar Hallam presents a clear
discussion of extra-constitutional limitations in (1914) 48 A~x. L. REV.
257-273. In the discussion of extra-constitutional limitations, judicial
opinions have used numerous phrases, such as inherent rights or principles,
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known of these statements is that of Justice Chase in Caldcr v.
Bull, that, "An act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law)
contraly to the great first principles of the social compact cannot
be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." 22
But there appear to be few cases in which statutes have been
declared unconstitutional upon a natural rights basis and that
alone. A near approach to such a basis, if not in fact an instance
of it, is Mott v. Pennsylvania. R. R.,23 where Chief Justice Lewis
said that a statute conferring a perpetual exemption from taxa-
tion, was "such a plain, palpable, and open violation of the rights
and liberties of the people, such a clear case of transcending the
just limits of legislative power, that the judiciary is bound to
pronounce such an act null and void;" and stated that no au-
thority was needed, because the principles relied upon "are
perfectly understood by every one who has the capacity to com-
prehend the nature of our free institutions." In the same case
Justice Lowrie based his opinion on a similar argument; but
Justice Knox reached the conclusion that the statute was uncon-
stitutional on the ground that a perpetual exemption from taxa-
tion was not within the constitutional grant of "legislative
power." Justice Knox's reasoning had a natural rights basis
equally as much as that of the other judges, but differs merely
in that it finds a convenient textual peg upon which to hang the
conclusion as to unconstitutionality. This illustrates one of the
greatest difficulties in determining the influence of natural law
theories upon decisions against the validity of statutes. No great
skill is required to find a provision of a constitutional text that
may be employed in part at least as a basis for a decision reached
largely as a result of theories of natural law. Nevertheless,
statements of natural right (or of other extra-constitutional
protection) are frequent; and though infrequently made the
sole basis of decision, they are by no means mere dicta in all
cases.
Pronouncements of doctrines of natural law may perhaps be
called dicta when they are found in cases where statutes were
upheld.2 4 So in Welch v. Wadsworth, the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors said:
natural justice, social compact, fundamental limitations, spirit of the con-
stitution, limitations growing out of the essential nature of free govern-
ments. Nothing of value is gained from an attempt to analyze and dis-
tinguish these terms.22 Supra note 13, at 388.
23 30 Pa. 9, 29 (1858). Perhaps Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay, 252 (S. C.
1792), should be classed as a case decided solely upon a natural rights basis.
24 Of such a character are the often-quoted statements of Justice Chase
in Calder v. Bull, supra note 13, at 388, and of Justice Story in Wilkinson
v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 657-8 (U. S. 1829). See also statements of Justice
Story in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43 (U. S. 1815).
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"Nor can it be claimed that the act in question conflicts with
any provision of the constitution of this state. There is nothing
in any of the provisions of that constitution which can restrain
the legislature from passing retrospective laws; and it is their
practice every year to do so, and not infrequently acts which
affect antecedent vested rights.
But the power of the legislature in this respect is not unlim-
ited. They cannot entirely disregard the fundamental principles
of the social compact. Those principles underlie all legislation,
irrespective of constitutional restraints, and if the act in question
is a clear violation of them, it is our duty to hold it abortive and
void." 25
The Connecticut court found that the statute involved in the
case did not conflict with the principles so stated; but they were
applied to determine the issue of its validity, and would not fall
within the usual definition of dicta. Similar in some respects is
the Wisconsin case of Nunnemadher v. State,2 where the court
laid down the principle that "the right to demand that property
pass by inheritance or will is an. inherent right subject only to
reasonable regulation by the legislature," but at the same time
took the view that inheritance or succession taxes did not violate
the inherent right found to exist.
Expressions of views in support of natural rights are fre-
quently found in dissenting opinions. But since standards of
natural right are largely personal, it may be that the majority
in such cases also adhere to natural rights views, which are
unexpressed and do not conflict with the decision.21
Courts often base decisions of unconstitutionality expressly
both upon doctrines of natural right and upon provisions of the
written constitution when the latter alone would have been
sufficient basis for the decision. 8 But decisions are frequently
25 30 Conn. 149, 155 (1861), based upon the more frequently cited case
of Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209 (1822).
26129 Wis. 190, 202, 108 N. W. 627, 630 (1906). See also Davis v.
Ballard, 1 J. J. Marsh 563 (Ky. 1829), and Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga.
31 (1847).
27 See dissent of Mayfield, J., in McLendon v. State, 179 Ala. 54, 63, 65,
69, 60 So. 392, 394, 395 (1912).
28 A natural rights basis in part may be asserted of the case of Durkee
v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 467 (1871), where Chief Justice Dixon said for
the Wisconsin court: "I care very little whether it is placed on those
fundamental principles of law and justice which, in our form of govern-
ment it has been held no legislative body can override, even though not
prohibited by the written constitution, or upon the provisions of the con-
stitution itself, some of which clearly forbid the enactment of such laws."
Similar statements may be found in Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288,
46 N. W. 128 (1890) State ex rel, Howe v. Des Moines, 103 Iowa 76, 88,
72 N. W. 639, 643 (1897); Norwich Gas Light Company v. Noi~vich City
Gas Light Company, 25 Conn. 19 (1856). See also People v. Supervisors
of Westchester, 4 Barb. 64 (N. Y. 1848).
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based upon two or more grounds, when one alone would perhaps
have been sufficient; and although the presence of one ground
may weaken the force of the other as authority, it is certainly
not permissible to select the one which we think the more
proper, and to treat the other as dictum. In a number of cases
statements of natural rights views are made but the decision of
unconstitutionality is expressly based upon the text of the con-
stitution. Theories of natural right, while influential in some
of these cases, may perhaps be regarded as a part of the
argument upon which a certain interpretation of the constitution
is based rather than as independent grounds for the decision
itself. Thus a narrowing of the term "legislative power"
through judicial decision has often had as its basis the notion
that the grant of "legislative power" does not permit legislative
interference with what the court may regard as a natural right.-
Especially in the earlier cases concerning the so-called vested
rights is it difficult to determine the extent of the influence
exerted by ex-a-constitutional considerations. Professor Corwin
has well said that the doctrine of vested rights is the basic one
in the constitutional development of the United States before the
Civil War.y0 To the protection of vested rights were applied
various constitutional provisions: the federal constitutional pro-
vision against the impairment of the obligation of contracts; an
enlarged interpretation of provisions regarding eminent domain;
provisions in certain constitutions requiring "reasonable" laws
or forbidding retrospective laws; due process of law and the law
of the land (destined to become the most important provisions) ;
and, most important of all before the Civil War, the principle
of separation of powers, with its narrowing construction of the
phrase "legislative power." These provisions, employed to pro-
29 Matter of Dorsey, '7 Porter 293, 376-378 (Ala. 1838) (Ormond, J.);
Regents of the University of Maryland v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365 (Mld.
1838) ; Bank of State v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599, 602-603 (Tenn. 1831) ; Henry
v. The Dubuque & Pacific R. R., 10 Ia. 540, 543-46 (1800); Cole v. La
Grange, 113 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 416 (1885). Other cases in which natural
rights views are used to aid constitutional construction are Ervine's Ap-
peal, 16 Pa. St. 256 (1851); Madison and Indianapolis R. R. v. WThiteneck,
8 Ind. 217 (1856); Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. 149 (N. Y. 1834);
Holden v. James, 11 Mlass. 396 (1814); Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312
(N. Y. 1868).
Chief Justice Marshall said in Fletcher -. Peck, 6 Cr. 87, 136 (U. S.
1810) that: " To the legislature all legislative power is granted; but the
question, whether the act of transferring the property of an individual to
the public, be in the nature of the legislative power, is well worthy of
serious reflection". And in this case, at p. 143, Justice Johnson based
his opinion in part on "the reason and nature of things; a principle which
will impose laws even on the Diety".
30 Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of Amcrican Constitutional Law (1914)
12 MIcH. L. REV. 247. See also Corwin, The Doctrine of Duc Process of
Law Before the Civil War (1911) 24 HARV. L. REv. 366, 460.
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tect vested rights, were steadily broadened in construction
through the application of theories of natural rights. "Justices
Wilson, Paterson, Story and Johnson, Chancellors Kent and
Walworth, Chief Justice Grimke, Parsons, Parker, Hosmer,
Ruffin and Buchanan all appealed to natural rights and the social
compact as limiting legislative powers. They and other judges
based decisions on this ground. The same doctrine was urged
by the greatest lawyers of the period without reproach." ,
These arguments were usually tied to some provision of the con-
stitution; and this was easy, since broad provisions were avail-
able which might without difficulty be interpreted to support the
judicial protection of vested right.
But in a number of the cases holding statutes invalid no ref-
erence is made to constitutional texts; the assertion that vested
rights are interfered with appears to be regarded as sufficient.
How may this be explained, especially if we bear in mind that
provisions of constitutional texts were in other instances applied
to similar cases? Had the courts thought it necessary or desir-
able to do so, they would have found no difficulty in bottoming
their views upon broadly interpreted provisions of the written
constitutions. The fact that this was not done is in some cases,
probably due to failure of courts expressly to mention written
provisions of the constitution which they had in mind. But the
practice, when taken in connection with a rather wide-spread
judicial acceptance of notions of natural rights, suggests that
the courts may have regarded it as proper to protect certain
rights, without the need of bringing them within the specific
terms of written constitutions. 32
And the constitutions themselves gave support to this view.
From the beginning of written state constitutions in 1776, many
provisions in the texts of these constitutions have expressly
stated theories of natural right. The Virginia bill of rights of
1776 declared that:
"All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have
certain inherent rights . . . namely, the, enjoyment of life and
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property,
and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."
Somewhat longer declarations of a similar character appear in
the Massachusetts constitution of 1780, and the New Hampshire
31 Corwin, op. cit. supra note 30, at 253.
32 See Wilderman v. Baltimore, 8 Md. 551 (1855); Conant v. Van Schalck,
24 Barb. 87 (N. Y. 1857); Hunter v. Hatch, 45 11. 178 (1867); Trim v.
McPherson, 7 Cold. (Tenn. 1869) 15; Albertson v. Landon, 42 Conn. 209
(1875); L. & T. Turnpike Co. v. Boss, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1954, 44 S. W. 981
(1898). The Louisiana constitution of 1845 expressly forbade the divesting
of vested rights. Art. 109.
[Vol. 401196
HeinOnline  -- 40 Yale L. J. 1196 1930-1931
1931] EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
constitution of 1784; and such provisions stand today in more
than two-thirds of the American state constitutions23 Provi-
sions of this type began to appear in state constitutions before
the establishment of judicial control over legislation, and may
have been regarded at first as declarations of governmental
policy rather than as enforceable limitations upon governmental
action. But with the development of judicial control, and with
the extension through it of the content of constitutional limita-
tions, these general declarations have occasionally served as the
basis for judicial action adverse to the validity of statutes, or
have been considered binding limitations for the testing of such
validity. The statement of Justice Winslow in Nulnnemachr V.
State has often been referred to by those discussing natural
rights in American constitutional law:
"That there are inherent rights existing in the people prior
to the maldng of any of our constitutions is a fact recognized
and declared by the'Declaration of Independence, and by sub-
stantially every state constitution. Our own constitution says
in its very first article: 'All men are born equally free and inde-
pendent and have certain inherent rights; among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights gov-
ernments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed. Notice the language, "to
secure these (inherent) rights governments are instituted'; not
to manufacture new rights or to confer them on its citizens, but
to conserve and secure to its citizens the exercise of pre-existing
rights. It is true that the inherent rights here referred to are
not defined but are included under the very general terms of 'life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' ""
The inherent or natural rights here referred to are not extra-
constitutional, but are found within the text of the constitution.
If the provision regarding inherent rights is to be construed as a
limitation, rather than as a mere declaration, Justice Winslow's
statement has much basis in state constitutional textsP A
3 3 NEW YORK INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1915) 971.
34 Supra note 26, at 200, 108 N. W. at 629. See also the statement of
Justice Doe (dissenting) in Orr %. Quimby, 54 N. H. 590, 616 (1874), and
the use of this statement in State v. Ramseyer, 73 N. H. 31, 58 At]. 958
(1904).
33 Constitutional guaranties of inherent or inalienable rights aided in
def~ating statutes in State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89, 101, 114 N. W. 137, 1"8
(1907) ; Chenoweth v. State Board, 57 Colo. 74, 84, 141 Pac. 132, 106
(1914); Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241, 249-50 (1867); and Beebe v. State,
6 Ind. 501, 510 (1855). People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244 (1850), should be
read with Beebe v. State and with Herman Y. State, 8 Ind. 515 (1855).
In the Gallagher case it was expressly urged that a prohibition law was
"repugnant to fundamental ideas and principles necessarily implied in a
free republican constitution," a view which was adopted by a dissenting
judge. See also Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198 (1853), and State v. Ash-
brook, 154 Mo. 375, 394, 55 S. W. 627, 632 (1899).
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statement somewhat similar to that of the Nunnemacher case
may be found in Ex parte Quarg, where a statute against scalp-
ing of theatre tickets was held unconstitutional, partly on the
basis of the constitutional guaranty securing to every person the
right of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property." Speak-
ing for the California Court, Justice Shaw said, "These rights
are in fact inherent in every natural person and do not depend
on constitutional grant or guaranty." 31
The development of natural rights doctrines has also been
furthered by certain constitutional clauses which are particularly
susceptible of wide interpretation in support of judicial action.
In Massachusetts broad results were in two cases aided by a con-
stitutional provision that the individual has a right to be pro-
tected "according to standing laws." 3T Similar aid has been ob-
tained from the grant of legislative power in Massachusetts
(1780) and New Hampshire (1784) to make "wholesome and
reasonable laws," and in Maine (1819) to make "reasonable"
laws.38 With respect to the New Hampshire clause, the view of
Chief Justice Perley in East'Kingston v. Towle is worth quoting:
"The power delegated by the constitution 'to make and ordain
all manner of reasonable and wholesome orders, laws,' etc. con-
fers no authority to make an order or law in plain violation of
the fundamental principles of natural justice, though the act
may not be prohibited by any express limitation in the constitu-
tion." 31
And in Winters v. Myers, 40 a statute giving public lands to pri-
vate individuals was invalidated by a decision based primarily
upon a provision in the Kansas bill of rights that,
"All political power is inherent in the people, and all free govern-
ments are founded on their authority, and are instituted for
their equal protection and benefit."
It is in the interpretation of broad and indefinite provisions
such as these that notions of natural right have been particularly
influential. If these provisions were to have a practical applica-
tion they could have it only with a body or content given to
36 149 Cal. 79, 80, 84 Pac. 766 (1906). See also Britton v. Board of
Commissioners, 129 Cal. 337, 344, 61 Pac. 1115, 1117 (1900), where a
declaration of unconstitutionality is based in part on a natural right to
organize political parties.
7 MASS. CONST. OF 1780, pt. I, art. X. Holden v. James. 11 Mass. 396
(1814); Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185 (Mass. 1855).
3S Kennebec Proprietors v. Laboree, 2 Me. 275 (1823); East Kingston v.
Towle, 48 N. H. 57 (1868).
39Supra note 38, at 59.
40 92 Kan. 414, 421, 140 Pac. 1033, 1036 (1914).
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them by judicial action; in this process of construction there
would naturally and necessarily be reflected the judicial point of
view at the time.
The desire of the courts to protect what they may regard as
natural rights has also raised extra-constitutional issues in
statutory construction. Especially has this been true of judi-
cial action seeking to avoid the retrospective operation of stat-
utes. In Ham v. M'Claws,41 the South Carolina court had be-
fore it a statudte of 1788 against the importation of slaves; this
statute replaced a precisely opposite statute of the preceding
year. Mrs. M'Claws, coming with slaves from Honduras, ar-
rived only a few days after the Act of 1788 had come into effect.
Her journey to South Carolina had begun while the earlier law
was in force, and when she could have had no knowledge of the
Act of 1788. Although the statute itself made no exceptions, its
forfeiture and penalities were found inapplicable to Mrs.
M'Claws. The court said:
"We are, therefore, bound to give such a construction to this
enacting clause of the Act of 1788, as will be consistent with
justice and the dictates of natural reason, though contrary to
the strict letter of the law."42
Strong views against retrospective constructions were ex.pressed
in two early Virginia cases. 3 The classical statement of this
attitude is presented by Kent's opinion in Dash V. Van Klceck,"
which confined a statute to prospective operation although its
terms appeared to be retrospective, and though the facts of the
case seem to suggest that justice would have been better accom-
plished by the latter construction. But in the cases just referred
to a prospective operation could be given to the statutes with
some plausibility and without defeating their whole purpose. In
Nornwman v. Heist,- ' however, a private act was deprived of all
practical application by an exclusively prospective interpretation.
Chief Justice Shaw, when a Massachusetts statute sought to
make juries judges of law, succeeded, in part upon theories of
natural right, in holding the statute constitutional by construing
it in such a manner that it would accomplish nothing4e
411 Bay 93 (S. C. 1789).
42Ibid. 98.
3 Turner v. Turner's Executrix, 4 Call. 234 (Va. 1792); Elliott's Exec-
utor v. Lyell, 3 Call. 268 (Va. 1802).
447 Johns. 477 (N. Y. 1811). For similar views see Fisher v. Cockerill,
5 T. B. lon. 129 (Ky. 1827), and Davis v. Mlinor, 1 How. 183 (Miss. 1835).
45 5 W. & S. 171 (Pa. 1843). The Delaware constitution of 177G and the
New Hampshire constitution of 1784 expressly forbade retrospective laws;
and similar provisions have appeared occasionally in later constitutions.
For further cases see Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws aizd Vested Rights
(1927) 5 Tmx. L. Ruv. 231.
- Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 Gray 185 (Mass. 1855).
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In the famous case of Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh,41
Chancellor Kent based his decision in part at least upon argu-
ments of natural right. This case illustrates the difficulty in
reaching agreement as to the bearing of doctrines of natural
rights upon the decision of the court. Professor Haines in his
recent volume says that Kent "held that in the absence of a con-
stitutional provision for the purpose compensation was due the
owner for property taken or damaged, and that the power of
eminent domain could be exercised for public pur'poses only. ' '48
This implies the judicial enforcement of a limitation not within
the text of the constitution. On the other hand, Professor
Thayer said:
"This case and that of Sinniekson v. Johnson," are sometimes
referred to as if they judicially held that in a State where the
Constitution is silent, the courts can disregard a legislative Act
which plainly and indisputably takes private prop erty for public
purposes, without providing for compensation. Neither case so
holds. In Gardner v. Newburgh, the statute was not set aside;
but its true construction was declared, and the defendants were
enjoined from violating it. This construction was reached on
the ground, first, that other parts of the statute indicated the
intention to be what is now laid down; and, second, that the con-
trary view would impute to the legislature what would be 'un-
just and contrary to the first principles of government.' This
method, in constitutional questions, that of construction, is one
on which courts may travel far; and they do and should." "
In a number of cases the principle of the separation of powers
has served as a justification for narrowing the meaning of "legis-
lative power" and broadening the protection accorded to prop-
erty. In the early cases preventing the delegation of legisla-
tive power, especially, appeals have been made to fundamental
principles of government not themselves expressed in the texts
of the constitutions. The first example of this appears to be the
Tennessee case of Marr v. Enloe," in which was involved the
validity of a statute conferring a taxing power upon the county
court, composed of persons not popularly elected. The statute
was held unconstitutional, upon grounds stated by Judge Catron
as follows:
"The constitution declares 'the legislative authority of this
state shall be vested in the General Assembly which shall consist
of a Senate and House of Representatives, both dependent on
the people'. Art. I, sec. 1. Is taxing the people an act of legisla-
4- 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N. Y. 1816).
48 HAINES, THE REVIVAL oF NATURAL LAv CONCEPTS (1930) 131.
492 Harrison 129 (N. J. 1839).
5 1 THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895) 983, n.
51 1 Yerg. 452 (Tenn. 1830).
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tion? That the taxing power belongs to the legislature-and
that exclusively-and is, if not the most important, at least of
equal magnitude with any power entrusted by the constitution
to the General Assembly, is a truism never doubted or denied
in Tennessee. Can this constitutional right, by an act of As-
sembly, be vested in a few individuals in each county, who are
wot dependent on the people, to tax without limit and even spend
at pleasure, without responsibility and without control? ... The
right to tax themselves through their representatives, in General
Assembly, is a constitutional right in the people. Representa-
tion and taxation are of necessity in our government inseparable,
as they must be in every free country. Whenever the people
are oppressed and bowed down with ruinous taxes, imposed
without their consent, their fancied freedom is an idle delusion,
and poverty and misery will as certainly overtake them in Ten-
nessee, as under the sway of an Asiatic Prince or Spanish King,
whose will is law, and whose exertions are limited only by his
desires. Our Fathers fought, conquered, and separated from
Great Britain to poor purpose, to preserve the principle 'that
taxatian, without representation was tyranny,' if we are at this
short day compelled to submit to its exercise in practice, by a
few individuals in each county." 52
The actual decision in Marr v. Enloe had little influence outside
of Tennessee, but Judge Catron set the standard for legal argu-
ments in many of the cases upon delegation of legislative power.
The next cases of constitutional importance arose in connec-
tion with the local option liquor legislation. In Rice v. Fostcr;-
in which a local option liquor law was declared unconstitutional
as a delegation of legislative power, Chief Justice Booth said:
"The proposition that an act of the legislature is not uncon-
stitutional unless it contravenes some express provision of the
constitution is, in the opinion of this court, untenable. The na-
ture and spirit of our republican form of government; the pur-
pose for which the constitution was formed, which is to protect
fife, liberty, reputation and property, and the right of all men
to attain objects suitable to their condition, without injury by
one to another; to secure the impartial administration of jus-
tice; and generally, the peace, safety and happiness of society,
have established limits to the exercise of legislative power be-
yond which it cannot pass. An act of the legislature directly
repugnant to the nature and spirit of our form of government,
or destructive of any of the great ends of the constitution, is
contrary to its true intent and meaning, and can have no more
obligatory force, than when it opposes some express prohibition
contained in that instrument. It is irrational to maintain that
such an act is a law, when it defeats the very object and inten-
tion of granting legislative power."
o2 Ibid.
53 4 Harr. 479 (Del. 1847).
"4 Ibid. 485.
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Chief Justice Booth expressed also what seemed the decisive
argument in the case:
"The frequent and unnecessary recurrence of popular elec-
tions, always demoralizing in their effects, are among the worst
evils that can befall a republican government; and the legisla-
tion depending upon them must be as variable as the passions
of the multitude. Each county will have a code of laws different
from the others; murder may be punished with death in one; by
imprisonment in another; by a fine in a third; slavery may exist
in one, and be abolished in another. The law of today will be
repealed or altered tomorrow, and everything be involved in
chaos and confusion. The General Assembly will become a body
merely to digest and prepare legislative propositions; and their
journals a register of bills to be submitted to the people for
their enactment. Finally, the people themselves will be over-
whelmed by the very evils and dangers against which the found-
ers of our government so anxiously intended to protect them; all
the barriers so carefully erected by the constitution around civil
liberty, to guard it against legislative encroachments, and against
the assaults of vindictive, arbitrary and excited majorities, will
be thrown down; and a pure democracy, 'the worst of all political
ills' will hold its sway over the hollow and lifeless form of a re-
publican government." 5
The case of Parker v. Commonwealth," which arose in Pennsyl-
vania in the same year, presents much the same line of judicial
assertion, though reference should be expressly made to Justice
Bell's remark that special precaution should be taken to guard
against the violation of the spirit of the constitution "and the
genius of the public institutions designed to be created by it."
Although sensibly opposed from the beginning by some courts,"1
the doctrine against local option laws led an active career for
a while ;58 now, however, it appears to languish, with but a limited
application in Tennessee."9
Notions of extra-constitutional limitations, based upon the
spirit of government, have also aided in decisions against the
submission of laws to the approval of electors of a state before
such laws should come into operation. The result in the import-
ant New York case of Barto v. Himrod, which held unconstitu-
tional a plan for a popular vote upon the adoption of a state
system of free schools, seems to have been influenced by the
views which are well expressed in the case by Justice Willard:
sS Ibid. 498.
56 6 Pa. 507, 511 (1847). Cf. Maize v. State, 4 Ind. 342 (1853); State
v. Swisher, 17 Tex. 441 (1856).
'7 Cf. People v. Reynolds, 10 Ill. 1 (1848); Bancroft v. Dumnas, 21 Vt,
456 (1849).
58 See, in addition to the cases already cited, State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529
(1853) ; Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa 491 (1857) ; Ex Parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279
(1874); Thornton v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 482 (1888).
so Reelfoot Lake Levee District v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151 (1896).
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"If this mode of legislation is permitted and becomes general,
it will soon bring to a close the whole system of representative
government which has been so justly our pride. The legislature
will become an irresponsible cabal, too timid to assume the re-
sponsibility of law-givers, and with just wisdom enough to de-
vise subtile schemes of imposture, to mislead the people. All
the checks against improvident legislation will be swept away;
and the character of the constitution will be radically changed." c
The reasoning of Barto v. Himrod was rejected by the Vermont
court in 1854,G1 and in the same year by four of the eight judges
of the Michigan Supreme Court 1 but the principle there laid
down was applied against liquor legislation in Iowa in 1855,G3
and in Minnesota " at about the same time, and has been adopted
in New Hampshire," Massachusetts ", and Maryland. 17 Barto v.
Himrod still represents the weight of decisions, although a tend-
ency the other way is indicated by decisions of the highest courts
of Wisconsin and New Jersey holding it proper, despite the
absence of express constitutional authorization, to make opera-
tion of a law contingent upon a favorable popular vote through-
out the state."
Some of the decisions above referred to upon delegation of
legislative power read more like political speeches than the sober
and careful utterances of impartial tribunals. Especially is this
true of the early local option decisions, from the results of which
the courts themselves soon departed. c* Theories favorable to a
representative form of government and against pure democracy
seem also responsible for a decision by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals against the initiative and referendum in muni-
cipal affairs70 although a different attitude toward extra-consti-
tutional limitations was taken by the Supreme Court of Texas.--
The cases upon the delegation of legislative power have been
based upon provisions in constitutional texts, but the differing
results must be attributed to influences outside the texts.
GO 8 N. Y. 483, 496 (1853).
61 State v. Parker, 26 Vt. 357 (1854) ; cf. State v. Scampini, 77 Vt. 92, 59
A. 201 (1904).
62 People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343 (1554).
63 Santo v. State, 2 Iowa 165 (1855).
04 See Roos v. State, 6 Blinn. 428, 433 (1861).
65 State v. Hayes, 61 N. H. 264 (1881).
G Opinion of Justices, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N. E. 488 (1894).
- Brawner v. Supervisors of Elections, 141 Md. 586, 119 AtI. 250 (1922).
68 State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961 (1910);
Hudspeth v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 AtL 780 (1914).
69 For an historical survey of the cases dealing with state-wide refer-
enda and with local option laws, see OBERIIOLTZER, REFERENDUM iN AMErICA
(new ed.) 200-218, 311-334.
7 0 Ex parte Farnsworth, 61 Tex. Cr. Rep. 342, 135 S. W. 538 (1911).
71 Brown v. Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S. W. 488 (1903).
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The doctrine of an inherent right of local self-government is
one largely created by extra-constitutional arguments. It is
true, as Professor McBain has indicated 7 2 that Judge Cooley's
opinion in People ex r'el Leroy v. Hurlbut " (the real foundation
of the doctrine) was based upon the interpretation of an express
constitutional provision, from which by implication was derived
a prohibition of legislative appointments for purely municipal
purposes. But it is also true that in a later Michigan case a
statute providing for the appointment rather than the elec-
tion of county commissioners was declared unconstitutional
upon an argument which can only have as its basis the theory of
local self-government, although here also the decision is justi-
fied as an interpretation of an express constitutional provision.7 4
Irrespective of what may have been the influence of the doc-
trine in Michigan, however, it has undoubtedly served as the
basis for declaring statutes unconstitutional, in the states of In-
diana,75 Iowa,7  Nebraska,77 and Kentucky,78 independently of
any provisions in the text of written constitutions. Curiously
enough, the Indiana court states the orthodox notion that there
are no limitations upon legislative power other than those in
state and federal constitutions, and then in the same case ap-
plies the doctrine of an inherent right of local self-government."
Such contradictions are not uncommon in judicial opinions. In
some of these cases, however, the courts suggest thit the deci-
sions are actually based upon constitutional texts, not, it is true,
upon any one provision of a constitution, but upon "general impli-
cation" from the instrument as a whole."' These general implica-
tions are likely to be merely disguises for extra-constitutional
limitations. But it is in the construction of specific constitutional
provisions that the doctrine of an inherent right of local self-
government has exerted its greatest influence; and in at least
72 For this whole subject, see MeBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right
of Local Self-government (1916) 16 COL. L. REV. 190, 299; pnd the same
author's LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1916).
7324 Mich. 44 (1871).
74 Board of Road Commissioners of Wayne County v. Board of Auditors,
148 Mich. 255, 111 N. W. 901 (1907).
75 See an adherence to and citation of earlier cases in State v. Fox, 158
Ind. 126, 63 N. E. 19 (1902).
7c State v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 89 N. W. 204 (1902).
7 State v. Moores, 55 Neb. 480, 76 N. W. 175 (1898), over-ruled by
Redell v. Moores, 63 Neb. 219, 88 N. W. 243 (1901).
78 City of Lexington v. Thompson, 113 Ky. 540, 68 S. W. 477 (1902).
79 Supra note 75, at 129, 63 N. E. at 20. And see 55 Neb. at 489, 76 N.
W. at 177.
so See, for example, the language in 55 Neb. at 496, 76 N. W. at 179
and 158 Ind. at 132, 63 N. E. at 21.
s8 In addition to cases referred to by Professor MeBain's articles, supra
note 72, see State v. Commissioners, 54 Ohio St. 333, 43 N. E. 587 (1896) ;
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two cases its use has resulted in interpretations which seem to
run directly counter to the texts. 2
The doctrine that taxes may not be levied except for a public
purpose furnishes another illustration of the influence of extra-
constitutional principles. The earlier cases often did not refer
to constitutional texts, but a number of them upon careful ex-
amination may be found to rest in whole or in part upon pro-
visions of the written constitution. So Chief Justice Black's
opinion in the important case of Sharpless v. Philadelphia8 is
definitely tied up with a constitutional provision requiring a
remedy "by due course of law;" and in the later Pennsylvania
case of Philadelphia Association v. Wood, Justice Lo=rie, in
disregarding an act of 1861, said:
"It is depriving a man of his property without due process of
law, even when it is sought to be done through the instru-
mentality of the courts, for the legislature cannot require one
man to give his money to another, and then give him an action
to enforce their will, and expect this to be treated as a remedy
by due course of law." 84
The earlier Massachusetts cases dealing with the public purpose
of taxation either were or could have been based upon a pro-
vision of the Massachusetts constitution,65 authorizing taxation
"for the public service, in the necessary defence and support of
the government, and the protection and preservation of the sub-
jects thereof...."I' A series of pronouncements by the Maine
court upon this same subject is also based either expressly or
impliedly upon the constitutional text; in the first of the series
there is reference to a multiplicity of constitutional clauses,
among them the provision that no person shall "be deprived
of his life, liberty, property or privileges, but by the judgment
of his peers or the law of the land." 86
and State v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 111 Pac. 734 (1910). As Professor
McBain says, the doctrine was rejected by the Texas Supreme Court in
Brown v. City of Galveston, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S. W. 488 (1903), although en-
dorsed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (a court of coordinate juris-
diction) in Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Cr. 1, 73 S. W. 811 (1903). For an
elaborate discussion and rejection of the doctrine see Wilson v. McGuinness,
78 N. J. L. 346, 75 Atl. 455 (1910). See also the several opinions in People
v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532 (1857). The doctrine was rejected in Booten v.
Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. E. 985 (1915).
S2 State v. Eldredge, 27 Utah 477, 76 Pac. 337 (1904) ; Ex parte Corliss,
16 N. D. 470, 114 N. W. 962 (1907).
8321 Pa. 147 (1853).
8439 Pa. 73, 82 (1861).
85 City of Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen 247 (Mass. 1864); Freeland v. Hast-
ings, 10 Allen 570 (Mass. 1865).
s6 Opinion of Justices, 58 Me. 590 (1871) ; Thompson v. Pittston, 59 Me.
545 (1871); Allen v. Jay, 60 Mle. 124 (1872).
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Yet it is true that in earlier Iowa cases a view was adopted
which substantially placed the limitation of taxation to public
purposes upon an extra-constitutional basis; 8 and the same
statement may be made of cases in Wisconsin and Michigan "I
in 1869 and 1870 respectively. The basis of the Michigan deci-
sion was clearly expressed by Judge Cooley:
"It is conceded, nevertheless, that there are certain limitations
upon this power, not prescribed in express terms by any con-
stitutional provision, but inherent in the subject itself, which at-
tend its exercise under all circumstances, and which are as in-
flexible and absolute in their restraints as if directly imposed in
the most positive form of words." 90
A South Carolina decision of 1884 is based upon much the same
view. 9'
In Loan Association v. Topeka 2 the Supreme Court of the
United States was passing upon the power, under a state con-
stitution, of a state legislature to tax for a private purpose.
The decision by the United States Supreme Court, in this and
subsequent cases of a similar character, has its real foundation
in Justice Miller's statement that,
"There are limitations on such power (of the departments of
government) which grow out of the essential nature of all free
governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without
which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected
by all governments entitled to the name." 13
In an article devoted to this subject, Professor McBain says
with respect to the doctrine of public purpose:
"The point is that it is established as a general doctrine, not
upon the basis of the due-process-of-law clause or any other
clause of federal or state constitutions, but upon an extra-con-
stitutional basis. It rests where Mr. Justice Miller put it in the
Loan Association case when he declared that 'there are limita-
tions on such (legislative) power which grow out of the essential
nature of all free governments, implied reservations of individual
rights, without which the social compact could not exist, and
which are respected by all governments entitled to the name.'
87 State v. Wapello County, 13 Iowa 388 (1862); Hanson v. Vernon, 27
Iowa 28 (1869); overruled by Stewart v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa
9 (1870).
88 Curtis' Administrator v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350 (1869).
89 People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870).
90 Ibid. 473.
91 Feldman v. Charleston, 23 S. C. 57, 63 (1884). Perry v. Keene, 56
N. H. 514 (1876), might be classed with these cases, were it not for the
fact that the issue as to public purposes was uncontested.
92 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874).
93 Ibid. 663. See also Cole v. La Grange, supra note 29.
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It rests where Chief Judge Dixon of the Wisconsin supreme court
put it when he declared that 'such a power would be obviously
incompatible with the genius and institutions of a free people;
and the practice of all liberal governments, as well as all judicial
authority, is against it.'04 It rests where the New York court
of appeals put it when the view was expressed that 'wt genwral
principles, it (the power of taxation) has, at least, one limita-
tion,' or where Judge McIver of the South Carolina court put
it when he said that 'it seems to be universally conceded.., that
a law authorizing taxation for any other than a public purpose
is void.' 9 It may be that this principle might have been included
under the requirement of due process of law with quite as liberal
show of reason as certain other principles to which that guaran-
tee has given rise; but the fact remains, as the law now stands,
that it has not been so included and that it is not a principle
of the federal constitution at all. It stands, in truth, as perhaps
the sole example of a fundamental and far-reaching 'constitu-
tional' doctrine founded not even upon implication from some
elastic clause of federal or state constitutions, but upon nothing
more concrete and definitive than 'general principles.' "',
This statement has much truth, but it cannot be altogether
accepted. A number of the important earlier cases were based
in part on constitutional provisions, but it is true that courts
reached the doctrine, whether -ith or without express consti-
tutional basis. They apparently felt that a certain result was
to be reached, and as is oftefitime true when new cases are pre-
sented, were uncertain as to the arguments by which the result
was to be sustained. In such cases of uncertainty, courts have
here, as elsewhere in our constitutional law, relied upon princi-
ples growing out of the essential nature of free governments.
But here, as elsewhere, the need for a textual basis soon re-
sults in one being found. Perhaps a satisfactory basis might
have been found in the customary provision that "private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public purpose without just compen-
sation," which was actually employed in Maine 5  But resort to
the broadest of constitutional guaranties was natural, and it is
not suiprising to find that early cases both in Pennsylvania and
.Maine were based in part upon "due process of law." In this
broad harbor of constitutional refuge it seems that "public pur-
pose in taxation" has at last found a safe and ample haven. In
many of the later cases due process of law is not expressly re-
ferred to, but appears to be the real basis of the decision.
Extra-constitutional principles also supplemented written con-
94 Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350, 354 (1869).
95 Bush v. Board of Supervisors, 159 N. Y. 212, 216 (1899).
96 Feldman v. Charleston, 23 S. C. 57, 62 (1884).
97 McBain, Taxation for a Private Purpose (1914) 29 PoL. Scr. Q. 185,
200. See this article for a citation and analyzis of cases.
9s Opinion of Justices, 58 Ale. 590 (1871).
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stitutional texts with respect to compensation for private prop-
erty taken for public use. This subject has been discussed in a
recent article by Professor J. A. C. Grant.D Many of the early
state constitutions contained no explicit requirement of compen-
sation for private property taken for public use, and several
state constitutions still contain no such provision. In Bwrron V.
Baltimore, a the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment to the federal constitution did not apply to the
states. Until the "due process of law" clause was inserted into
the Fourteenth Amendment and construed broadly enough to
afford protection, reliance could be placed only on state constitu-
tions to prevent the taking of private property for public use
without compensation. In the states having no specific consti-
tutional provisions, the courts were faced with the problem of
finding a ground upon which to afford protection. Statutory
construction accomplished this purpose in Gardner v. Trtstees
of Newburgh and Sinnickson v. Johnson,Db but in the Newburgh
case Chancellor Kent went beyond the ordinary limits of statutory
construction. The New Hampshire court afforded protection un-
der a constitutional provision that "no part of a man's property
shall be taken from him or applied to public uses, without his
own consent, or that of the representative body of the people" ;1'1
the Maryland High Court of Chancery relied upon "the law of
the land", and upon the statement that to deprive a man of his
property is to pronounce a sentence and not to enact a lawd The
Arkansas court relied upon "due process of law," but also said
that the requirement of compensation "is implied from the na-
ture and structure of our government, even if it were not em-
braced by necessary implication in other provisions of the bill
of rights" 90 e The Georgia court found no explicit constitutional
provision upon which to rely, but reached the same result, as-
serting that "a power to take private property, without compen-
sation, does not belong to any government"09r
The development just sketched illustrates the manner in which
extra-constitutional limitations have affected American consti-
tutional law. Relatively few cases have been based exclusively
upon limitations other than those in texts of constitutions. Cases
99 Grant, The "Higher Law" background of the Law of Eminent Domain
(1931), 6 Wis. Law Rev. 67.
09a 7 Pet 243 (U. S. 1833).
99b Supra, notes 47, 49 and 50.
99c Piscataqua Bridge v. N. H. Bridge, 7 N. H. 35, 66 (1834).
9d Harness v. Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. 248, 252 (1848).
99e Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198, 207 (1853) ; Cairo and Fulton R. R. Co.
v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494, 499 (1876). *
99f Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31 (1847); Parhan v. The Justices, 9 Ga.
341, 351 (1851).
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having such a basis have frequently come in the earlier stages of
the development of judicial protection. Independent notions of
natural law or of vested rights did not long continue as the prim-
ary or sole bases of constitutional decisions, because textual pro-
visions could be interpreted so as to afford safer protections. It
was not a mere coincidence that in one of the greatest early
cases expanding the notion of "due process of law" the theory of
extra-constitutional limitations was expressly rejected. 0o An
extra-constitutional limitation which has not found a constitu-
tional text into which it may be conveniently read leads a feeble
and languishing existence. The doctrine of an inherent right of
local self-government is an illustration of this statement.
The close relationship of constitutional to extra-constitutional
limitations is well illustrated by Judge Cooley's Caonstitzditonal
Lbitations. The learned author urges the doctrine that there
are no limitations upon legislatures outside of constitutional
texts, and seeks to explain an apparently opposing view of Justice
Story in Wilkinson v. Leland.'0' Cooley says:
"The question discussed by the learned judge in this case is
perceived to have been, What is the scope of a grant of legisla-
tive power to be exercised in conformity with the laws of Eng-
land? Whatever he says is pertinent to that question; and the
considerations he suggests are by way of argument to show that
the power to do certain unjust and oppressive acts was not cov-
ered by the grant of legislative power. It is not intimated that
if they were within the grant, they would be impliedly prohibited
because unjust and oppressive." 12
This comes perilously near to saying that there are no limitations
outside of the constitution, because every limitation desired can
be read into the constitution as a restriction upon the grant of
"legislative power." The notion is further elaborated in a form
that brings this out even more clearly:
"But when only the legislative power is delegated to one de-
partment and the judicial to another, it is not important that the
one should be expressly forbidden to try cases, or the other to
make laws. The assumption of judicial power by the legislature
in such a case is unconstitutional because, though not expressly
forbidden, it is nevertheless inconsistent with the provisions
which have conferred upon another department the power the
legislature is seeking to exercise. And for similar reasons a
legislative act which should undertake to make a judge the ar-
biter in his own controversies would be void because, though in
form a provision for the exercise of judicial power, in substance
it would be the creation of an arbitrary and irresponsible author-
10 Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 390-2, 411-12, 430, 452-3 (1856).
lo2 Pet. 627, 657 (U. S. 1829).
102 1 COOLY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (Sth ed. 1927) 343.
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ity, neither legislative, executive, nor judicial, and wholly un-
known to constitutional government. It could not be necessary
to forbid the judiciary to render judgment without suffering the
party to make defence; because it is implied in judicial authority
that there shall be a hearing before condemnation. Taxation can-
not be arbitrary, because its very definition includes apportion-
ment, nor can it be for a purpose not public, because that would
be a contradiction in terms. The right of local self-government
cannot be taken away, because all our constitutions assume its
continuance as the undoubted right of the people, and as an in-
separable incident to republican government. The bills of rights
in the American constitutions forbid that parties shall be de-
prived of property except by the law of the land; but if the
prohibition had been omitted, a legislative enactment to pass one
man's property over to another would nevertheless be void. If
the act proceeded upon the assumption that such other person
was justly entitled to the estate, and therefore it was trans-
ferred, it would be void because judicial in its nature; and if it
proceeded without reasons, it would be equally void, as neither
legislative nor judicial, but a mere arbitrary fiat. There is no
difficulty in saying that any such act, which under pretence of
exercising one power is usurping another, is opposed to the con-
stitution and void. It is assuming a power which the people, if
they have not granted it at all, have reserved to themselves. The
maxims of Magna Charta and the common law are the inter-
preters of constitutional grants of power, and those acts which
by those maxims the several departments of government are
forbidden to do cannot be consideied within any grant or ap-
portionment of power which the people in general terms have
made to those departments." 103
If the limitations listed in this quotation can be obtained from
the mere creation of three departments of government (without
even a formal announcement of the principle of separation of
powers), clearly no court should for long feel a necessity of bas-
ing decisions upon extra-constitutional limitations.
Extra-constitutional limitations have been primarily influential
in the determination of the validity of state laws. They have also
been present to some extent, usually as dicta, in the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court upon federal laws; " but in
the determination of the extent of Congressional authority, em-
phasis has been placed upon powers rather than upon limitations.
In theory a court is testing the agreement of an act with the
terms of a written constitution, but the process is not and cannot
be merely a mechanical one. Professor John C. Gray truly said
that in statutory interpretation "the meaning is derived from
the words according to the feeling of the judges, and not by any
1o Ibid. 356.
104 See statements in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 282, 290, 291, 21
Sup. Ct. 770, 785, 788 (1901). Citations to cases in the United States
Supreme Court are fully collected by Reeder, Constitutional and EZxtra-
Constitutional Restraints (1913) 61 U. of PA. L. REv., 441, 444.
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exact and fore-knowable processes of reasoning. Undoubtedly
rules for the interpretation of statutes have been sometimes laid
down but their generality shows plainly how much is left to
the opinion and judgment of the court." 111 This statement ap-
plies even more aptly to the broad and undefined words of con-
stitutions. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations devotes a chapter
to the construction of state constitutions, but the burden of the
discussion is merely that courts should construe constitutional
provisions in the light of the purposes to be accomplished thereby
(the purpose to be found by the court), using such aids as may
be available to reach this result. And Judge Cooley then thought
it necessary to suggest a warning against external aids or ar-
bitrary rules in constitutional construction.
Attempts to formulate rules of construction only emphasize
the area of discretion which is always present in the exercise of
the judicial function. Through the exercise of this discretion
it has been possible for courts to bring within the terms of con-
stitutional provisions the rights designated by Justice Field as
"those which of right belong to the citizens of all free govern-
ments". The content of broad constitutional guaranties is not
and cannot be determined by the constitutional language alone,
but is determined by judges in applying the guaranty to individ-
ual cases as they arise. The person who as judge decides the issue
cannot separate his judicial capacity from himself and his normal
mental processes; his view as to what ought to be is inseparable
from his determination of what is to be."' Broad clauses
cannot receive a real application in individual cases unless guided
by some principles of political or social philosophy. Perhaps the
term "natural law" may properly be applied to the influences
that in fact control the decisions in these cases; but nothing is
either gained or lost by such a designation.
It is not unusual to find a broad constitutional provision akin
to "equal protection of the laws" applied unequally in different
types of cases. Witness, for example, the liberality of the Su-
preme Court of Illinois as to classification for women's labor, and
its strictness against more defensible classifications in legislation
-05 GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW, (2d ed. 1921) 198.
106 If the statement above is true, one would expect judges as well as
others in the community, to be influenced by their political opinions. That
this is occasionally the case may appear from Pratt v. Breckinridge, 112
Ky. 1, 65 S. W. 136 (1901); State ex rel. Dowal v. Hamilton, 20 N. D. 592,
129 N. W. 916 (1910); State ex rel. George v. Aiken, 42 S. C. 222, 20 S. E.
221 (1894); and State v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S. W. 089 (1910). The
last case cited deals with legislative apportionment, and upon this question
courts are perhaps apt to find more of constitutional defect in an appor-
tionment made by the party opposed to that of the majority of the court.
Ex parte Heyman, 45 Tex. Cr. Rep. 532, 78 S. W. 349 (1904), is impossible
to understand on any legal basis, and probably had a political background.
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as to adult males. 1°7 The establishment of the doctrine that the
power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to
prohibit was directly assisted by considerations of wisdom and
morality which were expressly asserted by the United States
Supreme Court in upholding congressional prohibitions of in-
terstate commerce in articles affecting health, safety or morals.1""
When "due process of law" comes to mean "reasonable law,"
the judge's view of what is reasonable I'0 must be given specific
application, and from his philosophy (whether individualistic or
collectivistic) the clause derives its real content.
Such influences also make themselves felt upon clauses of a
more specific and technical character. So where a court is test-
ing sufficiency of title and singleness of subject in a bill, it ap-
pears occasionally to be affected by its own opinion of the desir-
ability of the measure. But in such cases as this, where the is-
sue is akin to one of fact rather than to one of law, the judge's
point of view, instead of becoming generalized as an influence
upon later decisions, limits itself primarily to the one case before
the court.
If the foregoing statements have any basis in fact, one would
expect to find the courts giving a liberal and expanded inter-
pretation to some provisions in constitutions and perhaps a re-
stricted interpretation to others. Judge Cooley has said:
"We do not say, however, that if a clause should be found in
a constitution which should appear at first blush to demand a
construction leading to monstrous and absurd consequences, it
might not be the duty of the court to question and cross-question
such clause closely, with a view to discover in it, if possible, some
other meaning more consistent with the general purposes and
aims of these instruments." 110
In state constitutions -interpretation has generally been an ex-
tended one, unfavorable to legislative power, rather than a re-
stricted and favorable one; and in some instances of the latter the
application of one clause has been restricted so as to give
broader application to another clause limiting legislative
power."" By a narrow construction the courts have wisely de-
107 Compare People v. Elerding, 254 Ill. 579, 98 N. E. 982 (1912), with
Josma v. Western Steel Car & Foundry Co., 249 Ill. 508, 94 N. E. 945
(1911).
108 See, for example, Lottery Case, 185 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903);
Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913) (whito slave
traffic); Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U. S. 510, 36 Sup. Ct. 190
(1916) (pure foods and drugs); Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432,
45 Sup. Ct. 345 (1925) (stolen automobiles).
109 Whether the test is whether he would regard it as reasonable, or
whether he could regard it as a view to be taken by a reasonable man,
110 Cooley, op. cit. supra note 102, at 153.
111 For cases of this sort, see Ex parte Corliss, 16 N. D. 470, 114 N. W.
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prived of much of its meaning the constitutional guaranty of a
right to keep and bear arms which was once thought important."-
Laws providing for the use of injunctions to enforce policies as
to liquor and morals have been upheld, although, unless we as-
sume the judges to be ignorant of facts known to the rest of the
community, they must have been aware that they were in this
respect restricting the sphere of trial by jury. The West Vir-
ginia constitution contains the most specific provisions against
the replacing of civil by military authority, but these provisions
were ignored by the West Virginia Court when in the opinion of
the court military authority was justified.12 Perhaps the most
striling case in American constitutional law of a restrictive in-
terpretation is that which in the Slaughter House Cases 114 read
out of the fourteenth amendment the "privileges and immuni-
ties" clause. This was done in the interest of state power, but
the ground thus ceded by the United States Supreme Court was
later retaken in large part under the "due process of law" and
"equal protection of the laws" clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Examples of extended construction unfavorable to legislative
power are much more numerous. The expansion of the principle
of separation of powers has already been referred to. There
has been an extension by construction of every part of the con-
stitutional provision that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." 112 The federal
962 (1907) and In re Dorsey, 7 Porter 293 (Ala. 1838). See also Dodd,
Implied Powers and Implied Limitations (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 137.
112See the discussion in Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 1, 72 S. E. 260
(1911).
113 State v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912); In re Jones, 71
W. Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1029 (1912). But see Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va.
713, 108 S. E. 428 (1921).
114 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873). See McGovney, Pririlcgcs or Immunities
Clause-Fourteenth Amendwnt (1918) 4 IoWA L. BULL. 219.
115 This expansion has been in part traced by Shattuck, The True Mean-
ing of the Term "Liberty" (1891) 4 HARv. L. REV. 365; Pound, Liberty
of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454; and Warren, The New "Libcrty"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 LRv. L. REv. 431. And see
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930).
"Due process of law" or the "law of the land" was capable of expansion
under a theory that it embodied into constitutions by implication all pro-
cedure and standards of protection at common law. The South Carolina
Supreme Court actually took the view that "law of the land" meant "the
common law and the statute law existing in this state at the adoption of
our constitution." State v. Simons, 2 Speers 761, 767 (S. C. 1844). See
also Zylstra v. Corporation of Charleston, 1 Bay 382, 391 (S. C. 1794);
Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38 (S. C. 1796); State v. Doherty, 60
Me. 504 (1872); and dissent in Smith v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 114 Mich. 460,
72 N. W. 328 (1897). Such a view would largely have destroyed possi-
bilities of legal progress, and has wisely been rejected. See Bertholf v.
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prohibition against state laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts was almost at once extended to transactions not within the
common law use of the term "contract", and this although there
is a frequently-quoted rule that language in constitutions should
be interpreted in the light of the common law.110
What has been said above amounts to a statement that courts
do consider the wisdom or expediency of interpreting a consti-
tutional provision in one way rather than in another; and this
practically amounts to saying that the courts consider the wis-
dom or expediency of statutes whose constitutionality is tested
before them. And yet, in judicial decisions perhaps no statement
is more often made than the one that the issue before the court
is purely one of constitutionality, and that the desirability of the
measure is not to be considered."17 But in new and doubtful
cases of constitutional construction these considerations are pre-
cisely the ones that are seldom absent. And although it has
been repeatedly said that legislative motives are not to be con-
sidered in passing upon questions of constitutionality, yet courts
have not been averse in a number of cases to commenting upon
and giving weight to what they regarded as the motive of the
legislature.""
Occasionally, though not frequently, courts have frankly
avowed expediency as the basis for their decisions. The Ohio
Supreme Court for many years sustained special legislation for
cities which seemed to run counter to the constitutional text. The
court later changed its attitude in this matter, and Justice Davis
in commenting upon the earlier view said:
O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509 (1878). Instead of this, the courts have wisely
adopted a notion of "due process" which permits them to recognize that
there is a changing content of this provision as protecting fundamental
rights. Perhaps it may be said that the courts have come to realize that
there is no fixed and unchangeable body of natural rights. See Freund,
(1916) 27 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICs 2. But in 1923, Mr. Justice
McReynolds, speaking for the court in Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390,
43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923), said that liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment
includes "those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
110 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 1810).
117 For a review of cases before 1875 see Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va, 612,
634 (1875).
118 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905) ; Hopper
v. Britt, 203 N. Y. 144, 157, 96 N. E. 371, 375 (1911); People v. Ringe,
197 N. Y. 143, 151, 90 N. E. 451, 454 (1910).
Legislation is necessarily to a large extent a result of a play of interests
(social, economic, political), with first one successful and then another; and
judges cannot be unconscious of this. See expression of Justice Holmes,
dissenting, in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1915).
Courts do comment on (and are influenced by) the results aimed at by leghs.
lation, and the differences between this and commenting upon legislative
motives is in some cases merely a matter of words.
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"It must be admitted that occasionally the court has seemed
to yield to considerations of expediency rather than to firmly
apply the unambiguous provisions of the constitution." 9
It is not unusual, either in expressions of judges or in legal
commentaries, to find judicial theory and judicial practice kept
in separate and unconnected compartments. Persons who as
judges strongly urge that the wisdom or expediency of measures
is not to be considered in constitutional construction praise in
unofficial utterance the wise expediency through which Chief
Justice Marshall established constitutional principles favorable
to national power. 20 An equally wise expediency brought the
court under Taney's chief justiceship to reverse an earlier too
narrow construction, and to extend the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States to all navigable waters, irre-
spective of whether the tide ebbed and flowed therein.12'1 And
the modification of earlier views with respect to the obligation
of contract, by Charles River Bridge v. Warcn Bridge,'2 2 was
dictated by a wise expediency, evidence of which appears upon
the face of Chief Justice Taney's opinion.
In state decisions, influences based upon the court's view of
the expediency or wisdom of measures clearly appear in the
earlier local option cases; in Michigan and Ohio cases affecting
cumulative methods of voting; and in many of the cases, here-
tofore cited, upon public purpose and an inherent right of local
self-government. One can hardly read the Lawyers' Tax Cascs
which arose in Tennessee in 1875 without feeling that the judges
had distinct convictions against the wisdom of imposing license
taxes upon lawyers. - 3 Mott v. Pcnsylrania Railroad Company
13 seems to be pretty clearly a case in which the Pennsylvania
court reached a certain result because it thought the result wise,
and one can hardly read the case without feeling that the result
was wise, irrespective of what he may think of the constitutional
19 Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St. '75, 77, 63 N. E. 594, 595 (1902). And see
Allen v. Scott, Dallam 615 (Texas 1844); Commonwealth v. Holloway, 42
Pa. 446 (1862); Ex parte Anderson 134 Cal. 69, 66 Pac. 194 (1901).
120 See, for example, Judge Cooley's statements in CoNSTITUTINAL HIS-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES AS SEEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AztERiCN
LAW (1890).
-12 Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443 (U. S. 1851).
1- 11 Pet. 420 (U. S. 1837). For other cases upon the face of which
expediency appears, see United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 6 Sup. CL
1109 (1886); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 21 Sup. Ct. 770 (1901);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 23 Sup. CL 787 (1903) ; and the recent
series of cases of which Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. CL
436 (1930), is the latest.
123 8 Heis. 565 (Tenn. 1875).
23a Supra note 23.
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arguments. The desire to decide in accordance with the merits
of a particular case often leads to the announcement of trouble-
some principles.124
The test of proportionateness of the legislative remedy to the
evils to be corrected, a test pretty well accepted in the field of
the police power, is at least partly based upon the opinion of
the judges as to the desirability of the remedy. Judicial author-
ity has not fully accepted Justice Holmes' statement that the
police power "may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned
by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and pre-
ponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to
the public welfare." 12 But Justice Holmes' standard, although
more favorable to the validity of legislation than that frequently
employed by the Court, is equally as indefinite as that generally
applied under "due process of law ;" in any case the judge's view
as to what is the "prevailing morality," (a view necessarily in-
fluenced by his own moral views) would be decisive. Even the
so-called liberal members of the United States Supreme Court
are not immune from the influences that determine the opinions
of other judges. Thus we find Mr. Justice Holmes writing the
court's opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,12" and Mr.
Justice Brandeis in dissent using the arguments often found in
Justice Holmes' dissents. And we find both Holmes and Brandeis
uniting in aid of the invalidation of Kansas legislation provid-
ing for the compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes.121
The recent case of O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Company,1 27a indicates that the United States Supreme Court
is now inclined to take a more favorable view toward acts of the
legislature. The classic statement of such a view, by Justice
Holmes in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 2b gives a wider range to
legislative activity and places responsibility for success or fail-
ire upon the political departments of the government, where it
properly belongs.' A difference of judicial view would have
avoided the sad experience of a number of states with laws for
124 See Witter v. Commissioners, 256 11. 616, 100 N. E. 148 (1912);
People v. McCormick, 261 Ill. 413, 103 N. E. 1053 (1914). See also State
v. O'Neil, 147 Ia. 513, 126 N. W. 454 (1910), where the decision could
have been but one way, but where the explanation of the decision made
difficulty for the members of the court.
125 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 111, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 188
(1911).
126 260 U. S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 158 (1922).
127 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 43
Sup. Ct. 630 (1923); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 44 Sup. Ct. 323
(1924) ; Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 267 U. S. 552,
45 Sup. Ct. 441 (1925).
127a 51 Sup. Ct. 130 (1931).
127b Supra, note 125.
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the guaranty of bank deposits,-- but the judicial department
cannot and should not act as guardian of the people. Yet a line
must be drawn somewhere, and we have given to the court the
discretionary power to draw that line.
What has been said above should not be construed as a state-
ment that courts annul statutes merely because they regard them
as inexpedient. But it does appear that courts in a great num-
ber of cases consider the element of expediency in reaching their
conclusions, and this element may be decisive in determining that
the decision shall go one way rather than another. This is not
intended as a criticism of the courts, but rather as a statement
of mental processes common to judges as well as to other human
beings. In constitutional law, as elsewhere in human institu-
tions, there is truth in Holmes' statement:
"The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or uncon-
scious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in deter-
mining the rules by which men should be governed."
By the side of this statement may well be placed that of Mr.
Justice Harlan, in AMwwngahela Bridge Company v. Unitcd
States:
"Suffice it to say that the courts have rarely, if ever, felt them-
selves so restrained by technical rules that they could not find
some remedy, consistent with the law, for acts, whether done by
government or by individual persons, that violated natural jus-
tice or were hostile to the fundamental principles devised for
the protection of the essential rights of property." -9
The discretionary element in constitutional construction has
much justification. With constitutions that are in many cases
difficult to change, and with broad constitutional guaranties
which must obtain their effectiveness largely through judicial
construction, the changing views of judges as to the expediency
or wisdom of legislation serve as a slow but progressive means
by which constitutions change to meet new conditions.', 9 For
2-CButts, Guaranty of Bank Deposits in Eight States (1931), 3 Mliss.
Law J., 186.
-2s HOLDIES, THE CO MI ION LAw, (1881) 1.
1- 216 U. S. 177, 195, 30 Sup. Ct. 356, 361 (1910).
330 Compare, for example, the judicial point of view in Ritchie v. People,
155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454 (1895), with that in Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill.
509, 91 N. E. 695 (1910); that of People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131, 81
N. E. 778 (1907) with that of People -. Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395,
108 N. E. 639 (1915); that of State v. Io. Pac. R. R., 242 Mo. 339,
147 S. W. 118 (1912) with the previous Missouri cases therein discussed;
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905), with Bunting
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example, the narrow judicial restrictions on delegation of legis-
lative power which were applied fifty years ago would be diffi-
cult of operation under the complex industrial conditions of the
present day. If broad constitutional texts were construed in
the same manner from generation to generation (through a rigid
adherence to precedent) adjustments would be much more diffi-
cult, and written guaranties possessing judicial enforceability
would have proven too burdensome an institution.
Constitutional change through judicial construction is not ac-
complished by a single judge nor by a court in a single instance.
A judge who writes an opinion is necessarily influenced and to
a large extent controlled by his associates. The court is influ-
enced by its own prior views and by the views of other courts.
But the doctrine of stare decisis is less controlling than in the
fields of private law, in part because reversals are less likely to
upset private rights, and in part because the constitutional prob-
lems of one generation differ from those of another.
v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (1917); and Blackstone v. Miller,
188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903) with Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S.
586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930). Harper, Natural Law in American Constitu-
tional History (1927) 26 MicH. L. R]lv. 62, refers to the judicial applica-
tion of broad constitutional provisions as involving "what may be called
natural law with a changing content." A somewhat similar view appears
in HAINES, REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAw CoNcsms (1930). For a brief dis-
cussion of Rudolf Stammler's theory of "a natural law with a variable
content," see Professor Haines' volume, at 248-250.
For an interesting recent review of this subject, see Grant, The Natural
Law Background of. Due Process (1931) 31 CoL. L. IR.Nv. 56.
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